Zitadelle: The German Offensive Against the Kursk Salient 4-17 July 1943 - Hardcover

Healy, Mark

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45 ratings by Goodreads

9781862273368: Zitadelle: The German Offensive Against the Kursk Salient 4-17 July 1943

Hardcover

ISBN 10: 1862273367 ISBN 13: 9781862273368

Publisher: The History Press, 2008

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This account of the great tank battle at Kursk, the turning point of the German Eastern offensive in July 1943, is a detailed and valuable analysis of the German and Russian actions during the confrontation. It describes fully the German attempt to excise the Kursk Salient, and the brilliant Russian defenses instigated during German delays which ultimately led to the defeat of the panzers and the Soviet advance on the Reich. The German and Russian tactics, plans, and realities of war on sodden battlefields are fully explored, and new light is shed on the scale of the German defeat, which has been exaggerated for years without question by historians who relied on Soviet accounts of the battle. It is brought to life by maps and a wide collection of photographs taken during the campaign.

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About the Author:

Mark Healy is the author of The Ancient Assyrians, Cannae 216 BC, and Kursk 1943.

Review:

I've read David Glantz's book on Kursk and thought very highly of it. Then I discovered the rave reviews for Mark Healy's book and had to read and compare the two books. Both books are well researched and are 5 star quality but the authors have different styles and formats. One book is a little better on one category but comes in second on another. Mr Healy has spent a little more than half the book on the preparation and introduction to the campaign. It starts with the relationship of Hitler and Manstein at the time of the Kharkov Offensive and then expands on the discussion with Zeitzler, Manstein and other generals in deciding on which form of the Kursk Offensive: the "Fronthand" or the less aggressive "Backhand Approach". Once decided, Mr Healy enumerates every situation or condition that will have an effect on the offensive. Its an extensive analysis that is impressive. It includes Stalin's spy ring, Churchill's notification of the offensive to Stalin, Hitler's delays, planning the offensive, Luftwaffe support, panzer production troubles, partisan interaction, Lend Lease assistance to Stalin and much more. I particularly liked the discussion on Hitler's views on Manstein. It was also significant how many of the generals disavowed the "Backhand" approach. Mr Glantz also discusses such items but not in as much length or detail. This area goes to Healy. The next area to compare would be Wonder Weapons and tanks in general. Mr Glantz discusses Hitler's new panzers in chapter one and in chapter two a little about Russian armor. The Tigers, Panthers and Elephants are furthered discussed throughout the book. Mr Healy devotes an entire section of 7 chapters - Part Three- to the subject of wonder weapons and tank tactics. The presentation is impressive. Mr Healy wins here. Mr Healy spends 170 pages on the offensive while David Glantz spends 176 pages. The volume is about the same but Glantz lists more engagements while Healy is more selective but gives greater depth to each selection. Mr Glantz covers the tank battles near Prokhorovka more fully. This is a close call but for me, I'll give it to Glantz. I have an interest for July 9th for its a pivotal day in the campaign. The moves and counter moves made that day will lead to the tank battles near Prokhorovka just three days later. Both authors cover the day well but Mr Healy writes an auxiliary chapter, Chapter 37, that discusses the Soviet contention that it was their blocking of Oboyan that caused the Germans to shift to the east toward Prokhorovka which resulted in the massive tank battles. He presents evidence to the contrary, that it was in the German battle plan back in May to shift to the northeast. Very interesting chapter. In a related matter, Mr Healy refutes Soviet claims of destroying thousands of panzers in the first few days. This theory is confirmed on July 13th when Manstein argues with Hitler to continue the battle in the south. Both Mansttein and Kempf were confident that by continuing the assault, Soviet tank reserves could be shattered. Near the end of Chapter 4, Mr Glantz states in his book that due to the stalled advance of Kempf and the stiff resistance facing 48th PzC driving north toward Oboyan that Hoth orders the 2nd SS PzC to shift its axis toward Prokhorovka. This would be more in tune with Soviet doctrine and a difference with Mr Healy. Another point of related interest is the number of tanks destroyed in the campaign. Both authors have similar comments and quote similar numbers for this topic. An important point is that the Germans were able to recover many damaged tanks for use in future battle. About 325 panzers were destroyed while another 1600 damaged panzers were recovered for future use. Its estimated that the Russians lost 1614 tanks, five times the number of German losses. This topic is a draw. --By Dave History Student

For a book on any battle of the Second World War this is exceptional, it leaves no stone unturned to find why in the first place that this particular conflict was sought, together with the opinions of all the Commanders of both sides before during and after the conflict. It lays to rest several anomalies that have been handed down over the years. It sets the scene for the largest tank battle of all time and leaves you in little doubt of the cost to man and machine over those terrible days in July 1943. At the height of the battle it was difficult put the book down, I can thoroughly recommend it to anyone with any interest in Second World Battles. --By Chisser

This is a very notable work; the author goes into great detail and research to give the reader the most up to date information that has been gleaned from previously unavailable sources. As other reviewers have commented many assertions made in the past about how matters transpired, at Kursk, have now been debunked. This book discusses the historical development of arms that was used in the battle, by both sides. The ground work for the Soviet in depth defence treatment of the battle front is looked at in detail, as well as the detailed preparations made by the German high command to try and finally break the Soviet forces. You will that the Germans used more personnel and materials than were previously amassed, for this battle by them, than on whole of the Eastern front since their invasion. The book is laced with good pictorials, diagrams and maps. My only very minor critique is the font sized in book was too small and I needed to you use glasses for the first time, which is probable, just me. Any serious reader interested in Kursk should read this weighty book. --By Sussman

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