Thunder on Dnepr: Zhukov-Stalin and the Defeat of Hitler's Blitzkrieg - Hardcover

Fugate, Bryan; Dvoretsky, Lev

Hardcover

ISBN 10: 0891415297 ISBN 13: 9780891415299

Publisher: Presidio Press, 1997

Synopsis

The authors claim that the failure of the Wehrmacht to conquer Russia during the campaign of 1941 was due to the brilliant planning of Marshals Zhukov and Timoshenko.

About this title

About the Author:

Bryan Fugate is a well-known authority on the Eastern Front and author of Operation Barbarossa. Lev Dvoretsky is a retired Russian colonel and expert on Russian military history.

Review:

The book disproves the myths that Stalin was unprepared, didn't expect a war, was useless, etc. How could anyone defeat a blitzkrieg launched by the largest invasion force in history? This book shows how it was done. If you want to know, read the book! --By A Custome

This book has caused me to re-evaluate my views of the 1941 part of the Great Patriotic War and my approach to creating a simulation of this campaign. The defense of the upper Dnepr has been documented in other books, but, that this defense was pre-conceived and not just spur-of-the-moment or last-ditch scrambling has never been made clear before now. I'm not sold on everything the author(s) contend. (E.g., rather than believe Pavlov was set up for failure, I'm more inclined to believe that Stalin allowed Zhukov and Timoshenko to start preparing a defense in depth in case Pavlov was wrong, which possibility showed up from the wargames, and/or in case the Germans struck while the Red Army was still being re-organized.) I perceive there were a number of reasons why the blitzkrieg failed in the Soviet Union. It is evident from the information in this book, that Soviet strategy for a defense in depth was a contributor. Overall I'm very pleased with the presentation of information in this book. The fresh perspective is both interesting and rewarding. --By A Customer

The authors have reconstructed, from circumstantial evidence, a revisionist interpretation of Red Army prewar planning and early war strategy. This is an excellent attempt to look at "the other side of the hill" (95% of what's out there being narrated from the German point of view. The authors know their material well, but the specifics of their case (a Soviet master plan based on February 1941 wargames kept secret from all but a handful of generals) hinges on only a few collateral documents. They can document a general similarity of Soviet operations with what they believe was the outcome of the wargame, but cannot conclusively link the two, except by arguing that Zhukov and Timoshenko were at the wargame and conducted grand strategy--ergo they must have employed the strategy from the game. This is dangerous ground upon which to rest your entire thesis. Nonetheless, this book is valuable for approaching the first weeks and months of the war from a Soviet perspective, and makes the point quite strongly that the Red Army had already thrown German operations off their timetable within the first month of the war. --By A Customer

About this edition

• Publisher: Presidio Press
• Publication date: 1997
• ISBN 10: 0891415297
• ISBN 13: 9780891415299
• Binding: Hardcover
• Edition number: 1
• Number of pages: 448