The last assault: The Battle of the Bulge reassessed - Hardcover

Charles Whiting

Hardcover

ISBN 10: 085052380X ISBN 13: 9780850523805

Publisher: Book Club Associates London, 1994

Synopsis

On 16th December 1944 Hitler launched his great assault on the West. In what became known as the Battle of the Bulge, three American divisions tried to stop three German armies, but within a week those divisions were decimated and the "surprise" German counter-attack developed into the greatest land-battle fought by the US in this century. But was it a surprise counter-attack, as Eisenhower always claimed? This reassessment of the battle contains evidence which indicates that the American Supreme Commander deliberately used the three divisions at the front as bait to lure the Germans out of their Siegfried Line fortifications. The price was high; 20,000 young Americans were killed, captured or wounded, and half a century later the author found when researching for this book that, despite the US Freedom of Information Act, doors were closed to him.

About this title

Review:

Charles Whiting prefaces his work with his prior belief that all the secretes of World War II had been discovered. With the official release of some previously classified documents, including ULTRA decriptions and other sources the very existence of which had been denied until recently, Whiting found what he believes to be a previously undiscovered secret: SHAEF knew about the impending Ardennes Offensive. Not only did Eisenhower do nothing to prevent the assault, he welcomed it as a means of engaging the tattered remains of the Wermacht outside the nearly impenetrable fortifications of the West Wall. As with other conspiracy theories (Area 54, J.F. Kennedy, etc.), once the theory is fashioned, it is easy to find facts supporting it. However, many of Whiting's points are compelling. Although Eisenhower had little or no ULTRA intelligence about the offensive, MAGIC was intercepting and decoding an astounding number of messages from the Japanese ambassador which outlined the location and time of the assault. Furthermore, there is no question that Eisenhower's staff, notably Omar Bradley, had spoken about the advantages to a German assault in Belgium as early as October, 1944. Whiting's theory, naturally, is less than solid. For example, he fails satisfactorily to explain his opinions as to the reasons why Eisenhower's "plan" failed. Was it that Ike never expected the 106th to put up any resistance? Did he not foresee the German assault bottling up at St. Vith? Did he not realize the heroic defense of Bastogne would create headlines? Nevertheless, as any frequent reader of Whiting's writing can attest, his work is a compelling read. If the theory were advanced for critical review, far more detail and supporting documentation would be necessary. As it is, much of the book is devoted to historical narrative about the Ardennes Offensive -- itself interesting. --David Kirk

This reader usually finds source-footnotes to be boring and irrelevant, but when grave accusations are made against a major historical figure, their absence lowers the value of the allegations to little more than tabloid level. Whiting, described on the dust-jacket as "a prolific author of war fiction", finds the conventional interpretations of the Ardennes Offensive to be the products of conspiracies and coverups, and the considerable American losses to be the result of Eisenhower's "evil, ill-conceived" strategy to lure the Germans out of their Seigfried Line. How Ike was able to direct the maniacal generalship of Hitler is not explained. The author's account of the battle is interesting when it focuses on the experiences of the ill-fated U.S. 28th and 106th Divisions, but it cannot be accepted as serious military history. --By WD Grissom

From Publishers Weekly:

In treating the Battle of the Bulge in the forests of the Ardennes in 1944, Whiting (Bloody Aachen) is best at the tactical level, offering a well-written narrative focusing on the hard fight made by the survivors of the overrun 106th Infantry Division, and on the weeklong stand at St. Vith that broke the back of the German attack. His argument, based on inferential reconstructions from archival sources, is unconvincing that Dwight Eisenhower knew of the planned offensive, deliberately weakened the Ardennes sector to draw Hitler's last reserves into a killing ground, then orchestrated a postwar cover-up of a decision so costly in American lives. The initial German successes are still best explained by the combination of intelligence failures and U.S. numerical weakness described in Charles MacDonald's definitive The Battle of the Bulge. (1984). Illustrations.

Copyright 1994 Cahners Business Information, Inc.

About this edition

• Publisher: Book Club Associates London
• Publication date: 1994
• ISBN 10: 085052380X
• ISBN 13: 9780850523805
• Binding: Hardcover
• Number of pages: 238